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STAFF STUDY ON ASSESSMENTS AND COVERAGE FOR
DEPOSIT INSURANCE*
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
After 15 years of operations, the FDIC has ac-
cumulated from assessment receipts and other earn-
ings an insurance fund of more than one billion
dollars. With this huge reserve fund increasing
rapidly (and considering the drawing fund of 3
billion dollars which the Corporation has with the
Treasury), it is appropriate to re-examine the whole
matter of public policy with regard to deposit
insurance.
The basic question is whether, for all practical
purposes, the existing reserve fund for deposit in-
surance is now large enough. The answer indi-
cated in this study is that the fund is now approach-
ing such a size.
Three further questions therefore need consider-
ation: first, whether the present benefits of the in-
surance should be increased; secondly, whether
there should be a revised assessment formula that
would moderate the assessment burden on insured
banks; and thirdly, whether both of these steps
could be taken at this time. The conclusions of
this study with respect to these questions are in
the affirmative and are set forth below:
Increase in deposit coverage. At present deposit
insurance is extended on all deposit accounts but
with a maximum coverage for individual accounts
of $5,000. With this coverage, about half of the
total dollar amount of bank deposits are insured;
in small banks where the accounts tend to be small,
the proportion of deposits insured is relatively high;
in large banks, where most of the large deposits
are held, the proportion of deposits insured is rela-
tively small.
The principal objection to an extension of deposit
insurance coverage is based on the belief that the
watchfulness of large depositors helps to promote
sound banking practices. It is felt by some ob-
*This background study is directed primarily to a review
and analysis of the coverage and assessment aspects of bank
deposit insurance. It was originally prepared in May 1949
and has been revised on the basis of comments and sugges-
tions received from the Federal Reserve Banks and the Fed-
eral Advisory Council.
servers that any substantial increase in coverage,
especially to full deposit coverage, would result in
an inevitable encroachment by supervisory authori-
ties on bank management responsibilities.
On the other hand, the weight of argument is in
favor of some increase in the coverage of deposit
insurance. Added coverage may help in achieving
more fully both of the major objectives of deposit
insurance—protection of the individual depositor
and promotion of stability in the economy as a
whole through protection of the money supply and
maintenance of public confidence in banks. The
sharp increase in the general price level, average
level of incomes, and bank deposits since prewar
has made the existing coverage less adequate than
it was 15 years ago. Expanded coverage would
also prove of advantage to smaller banks in getting
and retaining larger deposit accounts and further
would correct in part the unevenness of the insur-
ance burden relative to statutory coverage as it is
presently distributed among large and small banks.
As the FDIC currently functions, great emphasis
is placed on keeping "trouble" banks in active
operation through reorganization and mergers
rather than allowing them to be closed and paying
off promptly just the insured depositors. This
method of operation has been found to be cheaper
to the FDIC and has the great advantage of pro-
tecting communities against the depressing effects
of bank failures. If the present fund is adequate
to support an operating procedure of this kind at
current levels of insurance coverage, there is no
reason for thinking that it would be less adequate
at higher levels of coverage.
Moderation of the assessment burden. If the
deposit insurance reserve is not to be increased in-
definitely without regard for probable adequacy,
the present scheme of insurance assessment must be
revised at an early stage. Furthermore, a down-
ward revision of assessments, resulting in increased
bank earnings, would greatly strengthen the posi-
tion of the supervisory authorities in their efforts
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to encourage the progressive increase of bank
capital.
Some reduction in the assessment burden could
be effected by permitting deductions from the as-
sessment base for vault cash and reserves against
deposits, and perhaps for other riskless assets such
as short-term Government securities. A combina-
tion of such allowances, at the present assessment
rate, would reduce premium payments about 40
million dollars. This approach to the problem is
circuitous, however, and it would be better to
follow a more direct course in moderating the
assessment burden on insured banks.
The burden on banks of the insurance assessment
could be moderated in direct fashion by lowering,
at least for extended periods, the assessment rate.
One proposal, supported by banker groups, would
provide for the establishment of a statutory formula
for an automatic scale of assessments, based on the
previous year's losses, to range from a nominal
assessment up to 1/12 of 1 per cent. This plan,
however, would have a procyclical impact on banks
in that it would provide for raising rates sharply
in periods of banking difficulties and dropping
rates rapidly as conditions became favorable.
It would be preferable to moderate the assessment
burden through some formula which would mini-
mize the procyclical effect by providing for an
automatically varied premium rate under a statu-
tory formula allowing the fund to decline in pe-
riods of banking difficulty without a sharp rise
in assessment rates, and leaving the rebuilding of
the fund to a more gradual process. The present
level of the fund would be maintained over the long
run, but the formula would not place banks under
additional strain in periods of banking difficulties
by raising premium rates abruptly. A formula
along these lines would be entirely feasible. For
this purpose, the rate of assessment could be re-
lated to average loss experience over the previous
10-year period. Either the reserves of more than
1,100 million dollars that have now been accumu-
lated could be considered a maximum, or provision
might be made for tying the maximum size of the
fund to the volume of deposits to allow auto-
matically for any future substantial growth in
deposits.
Still another way of making provision for lower-
ing the present assessment burden would be to give
to the Corporation authority, after consultation
with other agencies such as the Federal Reserve
Board and the Secretary of the Treasury, to vary the
assessment rate within statutory limits. It is doubt-
ful, however, whether such an arrangement would
offer any important advantages as against the
formula proposed.
Whatever action may be taken to moderate the
assessment burden on insured banks, there is a
need for technical changes to simplify the pro-
cedures for computation of the assessment base,
such as use of deposits as of selected dates instead
of the daily average of deposits, and to make con-
sistent the definitions of terms used in determining
the volume of deposits for insurance assessment
purposes and for reserve and call report purposes.
Timing of proposed changes. An increase in
coverage and provision for easing the assessment
burden on banks are sometimes considered as mutu-
ally exclusive alternatives in the deposit insurance
program. The conclusion of this study, however,
is that both major steps could be taken concurrently,
and that early legislative action for this purpose
would be appropriate.
ASSESSMENTS AND COVERAGE FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE
Since the establishment of a national system of
deposit insurance, there have been numerous sug-
gestions for its amendment, some reaching the
status of bills before the Congress. In general these
proposals fall into two groups: those favoring an
increase in the amount of deposits insured, and
those favoring decreases in the base or rate of assess-
ment. Some proposals incorporate elements of both
groups—larger deposit coverage with a reduction
in the assessment rate and/or base.
Renewed interest in the whole subject of deposit
insurance has been stimulated by the size of the
insurance fund and the rate at which it has been
increasing in recent years. It has been possible
for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to
build the insurance fund to more than 1,100 million
dollars, while repaying the 289 million dollar con-
tribution to capital made originally by the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve Banks. Currently (at
present deposit levels) assessements are adding more
than 100 million dollars a year to the fund. Interest
from invested funds and other income more than
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pay for operational costs and current losses. In
1947, 38 million dollars was added to the fund
from these sources alone.
The powers granted to the Corporation permit
loans on and purchase of assets for the purpose of
amalgamating distressed banks with stronger banks.
These powers have provided the Corporation with
a very effective alternate procedure for dealing with
banks in difficulty. This alternate procedure has
resulted in much smaller losses than would have
come from outright liquidation proceedings and
consequently required less recourse to the insurance
funds.
INTEREST OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM IN
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
As the agent primarily responsible for monetary
•stability, the Federal Reserve System is vitally in-
terested in the functioning of an insurance pro-
gram which has as its primary objective the re-
moval of one of the prime causes of monetary in-
stability. Deposit insurance is potentially one of
the more important reforms directed to greater
monetary stability by the banking legislation of
the 1930's. In essence, these banking reforms
aimed at preventing a repetition of the wholesale
destruction of the money supply that occurred
during 1929-33. To that end the Board of Gover-
nors, among other things, was authorized to vary
reserve requirements within certain limits and to
prescribe margin requirements on listed stocks; the
Federal Reserve Banks were authorized to grant
credit on any sound bank asset; and provisions for
the issuance of Federal Reserve notes were liberal-
ized. It will be noted, however, that these changes
in System powers, while providing the necessary
elasticity in the banking system to cope with adverse
conditions, deal only indirectly with one of the
causal factors which in the past have greatly aggra-
vated cyclical developments, namely panic condi-
tions among depositors. Deposit insurance is the
instrument set up to prevent that considerable part
of a liquidating process which is due to the panic
withdrawal of funds by the general public.
System interest in possible changes in deposit
insurance arises also from another feature of the
deposit insurance plan. Under the existing ar-
rangement, member banks pay a disproportionate
share of the insurance cost. The assessment base
is total deposits less cash items in process of collec-
tion and each bank pays roughly in proportion to
the amount of its total deposits, regardless of how
much of these deposits is covered by insurance.
Since insurance coverage is limited to amounts of
$5,000 or less and the large accounts are in larger
banks, it is generally true that the larger the bank
the smaller the proportion of deposits covered.
Member banks have about 85 per cent of the total
assessment on commercial banks for deposit insur-
ance. Yet member banks tend to run larger in
size than nonmember banks with the result that
only about 37 per cent of member bank deposits
are covered as compared with about 72 per cent for
nonmember insured banks.
The Federal Reserve has a further interest in
deposit insurance because of its effects on ability
of banks individually to strengthen their capital
accounts. Assessments constitute a considerable
drain on bank earnings, thus hindering banks in
their attempt to improve their individual capital
positions. A decrease in assessments resulting in
increased bank earnings would materially aid banks
in attracting outside capital and in increasing their
capital directly through retained earnings.
This study explores three basic elements of
deposit insurance—-coverage of insurance, assess-
ment base, and rate of assessment—in order to make
available pertinent information and considerations
that should be taken into account in working out
basic changes in the present arrangements.
THE NEED FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE
The economic importance of deposit insurance
stems from the fact that liabilities of banks are
essentially demand liabilities to the public and that
these liabilities constitute the country's principal
means of payment, i.e., check money. All too often
in our history panic shifting of funds from one
bank to another and eventually panic withdrawals
of funds by the public from the banking system
have forced the banks to liquidate assets at most
unfavorable times. Distress calling of loans and
forced liquidation of securities by banks and bank
borrowers have led to widespread bank suspensions
and to a drastic destruction of the principal part
of the money supply—bank deposits.
Deposit insurance is useful in correcting these
unfortunate periodic experiences from two major
closely related viewpoints—that of the individual
and that of the nation. From the individuals'
standpoint, deposit insurance provides protection,
within limits, against the banking hazards of de-
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posit ownership. But the major virtue of deposit
insurance is for the nation as a whole. By assuring
the public, individuals and businesses alike, that
cash in the form of bank deposits is insured
up to a prescribed maximum, a major cause of in-
stability in the nation's money supply is removed.
Preservation of public confidence in the banks
makes for stability in the level of bank deposits
and for stability in the economy as a whole.
BACKGROUND OF PRESENT LAW
Federal insurance of bank deposits grew out of
the widespread bank failures of the I920's and
early I930's. The Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration was established by the Banking Act of
1933, with amendments by the Banking Act of
1935.
There was little experience and information on
which to base a scheme to insure bank depositors
against loss. Rates of assessment, the assessment
base, and insurance coverage all had to be deter-
mined more by current judgment than on the basis
of actuarial experience. In fact, such experience as
was available—various State deposit insurance
funds—was so unfortunate that had it been used,
insurance rates might well have been prohibitive.
In recommending the present rate and base, the
FDIC had some data on annual rates of loss to
depositors for the period beginning 1863. As
eventually revised, covering the period 1863-1940,
these data show that annual losses to depositors
from bank suspensions ranged from less than 0.01
per cent of all deposits in operating banks to slightly
more than 2 per cent. It is estimated that about
two-thirds of the total losses to depositors in closed
banks over the 76 years occurred in 12 particular
years, 1873, 1875-78, 1884, 1891, 1893, and 1930-33.
About half of the total loss was in the 1930-33
period.
Present assessment rate. The statutory assess-
ment rate was set as follows: Total losses to de-
positors in closed or suspended commercial banks
for the period 1863-1933 were estimated at about
2.7 billion dollars, excluding assessments of about
500 million dollars from bank stockholders (actual
loss about 2.2 billion dollars), or an average annual
rate of 1/5 of 1 per cent of deposits in operating
banks. Deposit balances not exceeding $5,000
were estimated to have accounted for approximately
three-fourths of these losses. The annual average
rate of assessment necessary to have covered losses
on these deposit balances would have been about
1/7 of 1 per cent of total deposits (less cash collec-
tion items) in operating banks. It was assumed
that banking reforms would eliminate repetition
of the so-called crisis years mentioned earlier in
which losses to depositors were heavy. Losses in
the noncrisis years were 1/12 of 1 per cent for all
deposits in active banks. The rate then is the
equivalent of closed bank losses against all deposits
in the noncrisis years.
Present assessment base. The statutory assess-
ment base selected for Federal insurance of deposits
was total deposits plus trust funds less cash items
in the process of collection. This base was selected
despite the fact that many banks would have essen-
tially full coverage out of the common fund
whereas others, mainly the larger banks, a large
proportion of whose deposits would represent large
accounts, would have a considerably smaller pro-
portion of their deposits insured. It was thought
that the indirect benefits from deposit insurance for
larger banks fully justified their more than pro-
portionate assessment contribution.
Limitation of insurance to $$,ooo. The limitation
of Federal deposit insurance to $5,000 was frankly
designed to insure "the mass of depositors with
small accounts." With this limitation on coverage,
about 98 per cent of depositors were fully insured.
As a result of the increase in the average size of
deposits in recent years, the proportion has fallen
slightly to about 96 per cent at present.
Merger vs. receivership procedure. There are
two procedures by which the Corporation may pro-
tect the deposit holders of insured banks in financial
difficulty. One is an advance or purchase of certain
assets by the Corporation to facilitate assumption of
the deposit liabilities of a weak or insolvent bank
by another bank in the same or nearby community.
The other is to act as receiver for an insolvent
bank, paying off insured deposits. The merger
method has been much more widely used in recent
years. This method is clearly superior on several
counts: ordinary business has not been disrupted
by an interruption of banking services; all depositors
have been protected; depositor losses to be met by
the Corporation have been less severe; and un-
desirable repercussions on neighboring banks and
communities have been held to a minimum.
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THE RECORD—1934-47
Bank suspensions as well as bank deposit losses
have been small since Federal insurance of deposits
was established. Over the period of more than 13
years, 1934-47, only 404 banks have required as-
sistance. As Table 1 indicates, 245 were placed
in receivership and 159 were merged with other
banks. Losses to the Corporation in these opera-
tions were about 26 million dollars. Actual losses
to depositors were less than 2 million dollars for
the entire period.
TABLE 1
DEPOSITS AND LOSSES IN INSURED BANKS PLACED IN RECEIVER-
SHIP OR MERGED WITH FINANCIAL AID OF THE FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, 1934-47
Item
Number of banks
Amount of deposits. . .























Source.—Annual Report of Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion for 1947, p. 14.
Precisely how much influence deposit insurance
has had in this excellent record and how much must
be credited to other factors cannot be determined.
The entire period of the Corporation's existence ex-
cept for a part of the years 1937-38 was one of
rapidly expanding bank credit, generally rising
prices, and expanding business activity. The vio-
lent bank upheaval of the early 1930's undoubtedly
removed from business most banks not structurally
sound or economically necessary, resulted in a dras-
tic house cleaning of many banks which survived,
and provided a good deal of hard-won experience
for individual bankers. Bank supervision has also
improved greatly as a result of the experience in
the 1930's. Financial developments, too, partic-
ularly the enormous and continuous growth of the
public debt over the period to 1946 and the stabili-
zation of the Government security market by the
Federal Reserve System have permitted banks to
acquire a larger proportion of liquid assets than was
the case in earlier years.
Is THE PRESENT INSURANCE FUND LARGE ENOUGH?
No one can say exactly what the size of the FDIC
surplus fund should be if it is to be fully adequate
to meet any contingency. It is not feasible to apply
rigorous actuarial principles to bank deposit insur-
ance to determine precisely the size of the insurance
reserve fund that is needed. Historically losses to
depositors through bank closings have been concen-
trated in particular periods of economic upheaval.
These losses could not have been forecast either as
to timing or amount. On the basis of the generally
recognized principle that most bank assets are
sound, assuming integrity of management, losses
to depositors or to an insurance fund should be low
providing there is time and opportunity to liquidate
the bank assets in an orderly fashion. Under such
conditions, an insurance fund of the present size
should be more than adequate to take care of ulti-
mate losses.
When public loss of confidence in banks be-
comes a major factor, however, a larger fund is
needed in order to pay off depositors and hold assets
until conditions are proper for their liquidation,
and for this reason the FDIC now has a drawing
fund available from the Treasury of 3 billion dol-
lars. If confidence is fully undermined, then no
reasonable fund would be large enough to meet
liquidation problems arising from panic with-
drawals of deposits. But provision for ultimate
liquidity of deposits is basically not properly the
task of an insurance fund; it is the responsibility
of the central bank—i.e., the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. Under the legislation of the 1930's, the
System is in a greatly strengthened position to dis-
charge that task.
At present the insurance fund is very large and
is growing rapidly. At the end of 1948 it was
about 1,100 million dollars, an amount approxi-
mately equal to the total reported losses of all
depositors in the 1930-33 period. Assessments paid
by all insured banks are currently about 120 mil-
lion dollars a year, as is shown in Table 2. Of
particular interest is the very large current income
from investments. Almost a quarter of a billion
dollars has been added to the insurance fund from
this source. This sum is three times the total
expenses of the Corporation since its beginning,
and more than nine times the deposit insurance
losses and expenditures since 1934. Moreover,
while the Corporation's expenses have tended to
remain relatively constant, income from invest-
ments has tended to increase at a rapid rate. The
investment income, of course, is in addition to
assessments.
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TABLE. 2
INCOME AND EXPENSES OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION SINCE BEGINNING OPERATIONS



































































































































































Source.—Annual Report of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation for 1947, p. 28, and FDIC Report to Insured Banks,
Dec. 31, 1948.
The fund was set up for paying ofiE ultimate
losses to depositors on deposits in amounts of
$5,000 or less. Actually the Corporation has two
functions and uses the fund in both. First, it is
a liquidating or merger agency and secondly, it is
the insurance agency which absorbs losses arising
out of its liquidating activity. As a liquidating
agency, it acts as a receiver, pays off insured de-
positors as fast as claims can be proved, and at-
tempts to realize on assets of liquidated banks. It
is, however, only the difference between the realized
value of the assets and the amount paid to meet
depositors' claims that needs to be absorbed in its
insurance function.
The liquidating function requires the availability
to the FDIC of a large amount of money. Bank
assets cannot be liquidated overnight; indeed, pub-
lic policy might and probably would require that
such assets should be held for gradual liquidation,
particularly in the event of wide-scale suspensions.
It was to meet this need that the FDIC was given
a 3 billion dollar drawing fund at the United States'
Treasury. On the other hand, the size of the fund
needed for the insurance function—and this is the
fund that should be provided out of assessments and
investment income—is related only to the losses
(over and above those covered by bank capital)
that would be sustained in the final liquidation of
assets.
Those who believe that the insurance fund is not
now large enough have called attention principally
to the decline in the ratio of bank capital to bank
assets, to a recent increase in substandard assets,,
and to the danger of rising losses from defalcation
by bank employees. The decline in the ratio of
bank capital to bank assets has been substantial.
During the twenties and in the middle thirties,
member bank capital averaged between 11 and 14
per cent of total member bank assets. After 1938,
and particularly during the early war years (1939-
43) this ratio declined sharply to about 6 per
cent, and since 1944 has risen slightly to 7 per cent
as of April 1949. Most of the asset expansion since
1938, however, has been due to larger bank hold-
ings of United States Government securities which
are free of credit risk. The ratio for member banks
of capital to "risk assets" is currently considerably
higher than in the twenties, although below the
level of the thirties and the war years, both periods
when bank lending operations were abnormally
curtailed. In 1947 and 1948, banks added to their
capital at about the same rate as they increased their
risk assets, and so the ratio of capital to risk assets
has remained about unchanged.
Available statistical evidence does not indicate
that any significant deterioration in the quality of
bank assets has occurred in recent years. Accord-
ing to an FDIC report to insured banks, dated Feb-
ruary 23, 1949, there has been a steady improve-
ment in the quality of bank assets over the past 15
years. In 1948 the volume of substandard assets
was only about one-half of 1 per cent of total assets,,
slightly more than two years ago but very much
less than in 1939, when it was 5 per cent of
total bank assets. Further evidence of a signifi-
cant quality improvement in bank assets since 1935
is given in Table 3. United States Government
securities now represent about 40 per cent of total
assets of insured banks as compared with 8 per cent
in 1929, and 28 per cent in 1939. This is true
despite a record-breaking increase in loans in the
past several years. Loans as a whole have decreased
in relative importance from about 55 per cent of
bank assets in 1929 to about 28 per cent in 1948.
What the table cannot show is improvement in-
risk quality of the loan portfolio. For example,.
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TABLE 3
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1 Percentages refer to member bank data only.
although real-estate loans represent almost identi-
cal proportions of total assets in 1948 and in 1929,
provisions for amortization plus the fact that much
of the real-estate loan portfolio is now guaranteed
by Federal agencies put these loans in a much im-
proved risk category. Moreover, improved risk
quality applies in varying degrees to other cate-
gories of the loan portfolio.
Defalcations were an important or controlling
factor in the difficulties of five (and perhaps six) of
the total of seven banks whose depositors the Corpo-
ration was called upon to protect in 1945, 1946, and
1947. The problems that arose were related to the
fact that fidelity protection was not in keeping with
the risks and responsibilities involved. While de-
falcations have been an important cause with the
very few banks that have experienced difficulties
recently, they can scarcely be considered of large
enough general importance to place the present de-
posit insurance fund in jeopardy. In any, event,
the remedy is greater bank fidelity coverage, not a
larger deposit insurance fund.
Effect of reduced assessments on ban\ capital
accounts. Reflecting the large increase in bank de-
posits in relation to capital since prewar years, banks
generally have been under continuous pressure
from supervisory authorities to strengthen their
capital positions through reinvesting earnings and
through sales of additional capital stock. From a
long-range point of view, the steady strengthening
of bank capital positions is necessary if banks are
to function effectively in financing expansion of
American business. The shares of many banks
are now selling at a discount from their liquidating
values. As a result, these institutions are finding
it difficult to sell additional stock at prices con-
sidered attractive to bank management.
A reduction of FDIC assessments from 1/12 to
1/50 of 1 per cent would amount to about 90 mil-
lion dollars, or about 12 per cent of bank net profits
in 1948. An increase in bank profits of this amount
should enable banks to plow back more earnings
into capital accounts and to float new issues of
capital stock at more satisfactory prices. Such an
increase in bank earnings, moreover, would greatly
help the supervisory authorities in their efforts to
encourage banks to increase their capital.
Can the assessment rate safely be cut? In view
of the size of the insurance fund at the present
time, the answer to this question is believed to be
in the affirmative. The question of what kind of
a formula might be used to effect such a cut is
considered in following sections.
Can the insurance coverage be increased? Some
discussions of the status of deposit insurance have
been predicated on the assumption that either the
assessment might be cut or the coverage of deposit
insurance could be increased. These two courses
of action, however, are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive. In a following section it is suggested that
extension of the coverage of deposit insurance
might strengthen rather than weaken the adequacy
of the present fund by increasing public confidence
in banks. Further, it is not true as a practical
matter that the insurance liabilities of the FDIC
would be much if any increased by an increase in
coverage, say to $10,000 or even to $25,000. The
Corporation now in fact tends to protect all de-
posits through its merger procedure described in
a preceding section.
PROPOSALS RELATING TO INSURANCE COVERAGE
With respect to deposit insurance coverage, three
types of proposals have been made. First, there
are those who hold that the present coverage is ade-
quate and that there should be no change. Sec-
ondly, it has been suggested that all deposits should
be insured. Thirdly, bills now pending in Con-
gress would double or triple the coverage of deposit
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insurance. The advantages and disadvantages of
these alternatives are discussed below.
No change in coverage. Arguments for no change
in deposit insurance coverage generally fall into
one of the following three broad categories:
1. The fund is not large enough to meet the
potential liabilities arising out of increased cover-
age- ,
2. In an independent unit banking system such
as ours, it would not be advisable to increase
insurance coverage because the policing influence
that large depositors exert for the promotion of
sound banking practices would be removed and
the role of the bank supervisory authorities would
be correspondingly expanded.
3. The banking legislation of the thirties cor-
rected the deficiencies in the banking system
which gave rise to large deposit losses and de-
positor panic and in consequence no insurance at
all is really needed. Thus, no increase in insur-
ance coverage is required.
The question whether the fund is large enough
now to support increased coverage was discussed
in a previous section, with the answer in the
affirmative.
The second objection to a change in coverage of
deposit insurance is in part based on the feeling
that such extension would result in placing a "prem-
ium on bad banking." That is to say, if full deposit
insurance coverage were in effect, it would tend to
lift the influence that watchful, large depositors may
have over the loan and investment and other policies
of bankers. Even if deposit insurance were in-
creased to some amount greater than $5,000 but
less than full coverage, a smaller group of individ-
uals than now would be concerned with the safety
of their deposits and consequently with the solvency
of their banks.
It is difficult to evaluate in specific terms the
extent of this kind of influence. Undoubtedly, bank-
ers are restrained, in many cases, from going heav-
ily into certain types of credit in part by the knowl-
edge that some large depositors are following
closely the bank's lending and investing policies
and may withdraw their funds if disturbed by a
movement of the bank into more risky assets. Un-
der full or substantially increased coverage, "con-
servative banking" might no longer be an asset in
competition among banks for accounts of large
depositors. Competition might rather be intensified
in the service fields. It is conceivable that service
competition might prove so costly as to influence
banks into much riskier credit policies. With a
significant expansion in deposit coverage it is there-
fore argued that the scale of bank supervision
would need to be materially enlarged.
Lastly, extension of deposit insurance is some-
times opposed on the ground that banking reforms
during and since the mid-1930's, legislative and
otherwise, have largely corrected the weaknesses in
the banking system which formerly engendered
depositor losses and panic. Two fundamental re-
forms in banking practice illustrate the application
of experience gained during the depression to the
strengthening of the banking system. An agree-
ment among bank supervisory agencies in 1938
represents a change in the concept of appraising
bank assets from a basis of liquidating value to a
basis of going-concern value. For example, high-
grade bonds are valued at the lower of book or
amortized cost and loans are classified only on the
basis of some question in regard to payment. Under
this arrangement bank supervision should help to
prevent forced liquidation of assets rather than
contribute to such liquidation. A second major
improvement in banking practice has been the
growing tendency, under the prodding of super-
visory authorities, to establish adequate reserves
against losses. This trend was greatly stimulated
by the recent ruling of the Bureau of Internal Reve-
nue (Mimeograph 6209) under which banks are
permitted to establish such reserves out of income
for tax purposes.
The authority given to the Federal Reserve to
lend on any sound bank asset is also cited as a
measure that vastly increases the capacity of the
banking system to meet demands for funds. From
this point of view, it is argued that, because of bank-
ing reforms, insurance of bank deposits is no longer
essential. Adherents to this view, however, recog-
nize the general acceptance of the existing insurance
plan as part of the warp and woof of our present-day
banking and do not usually recommend its elimi-
nation. But neither is expansion of the insurance
program considered necessary or desirable.
1
Full deposit insurance coverage. The case for
full deposit insurance coverage rests basically on
the thesis that the primary function of deposit
XA somewhat different interpretation of the interrelation-
ship between deposit insurance and the banking reforms of
the 1930's is given in the following section.
158 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN
Federal Reserve Bulletin: February 1950STAFF STUDY ON ASSESSMENTS AND COVERAGE FOB. DEPOSIT INSURANCE
insurance is to protect the money supply and
thus to contribute to general economic stability,
and that the lessons of past financial crises show
that extension of insurance to cover all deposits is
essential to the full accomplishment of those objec-
tives. With respect to this thesis, the following
points are made, which are developed in subsequent
paragraphs:
1. More than half of the dollar amount of
all individual and business deposits is in non-
insured accounts. Large rather than small de-
positors historically have exerted the main pres-
sure on banks' liquidity positions.
2. Many deposits of more than $5,000 are small
business balances, loss of which would result
in economic distress to individuals and the com-
munity.
3. Substantially full deposit coverage is already
provided in actual practice, but full advantage
has not been taken of its stabilizing value.
4. Although reforms in banking and in the
economy as a whole, supplemented by experi-
ence gained in the last depression, reduce the
probability of another prolonged major depres-
sion, and the quality of bank assets and banking
practices in general appears to be much better
than in any previous period of modern banking
experience, full coverage of deposit insurance is
needed to round out the necessary precautionary
measures.
Subsidiary arguments for full deposit insurance
coverage are made on grounds of equitable treat-
ment of large and small banks and large and small
depositors.
Federal Reserve surveys of ownership of demand
deposits indicate that about two-thirds of the total
amount of demand deposits held by businesses and
individuals is in balances of $10,000 or more, and
more than half is in balances of $25,000 or more.
Unfortunately, there are no current estimates of
balances of $5,000 or less but it seems probable that
more than 70 per cent of all private demand de-
posits is in accounts in excess of $5,000. Reinforc-
ing this evidence that the bulk of demand deposits
is in the large accounts is the FDIC's 1945 sur-
vey.
2 According to this survey only 28.7 billion
dollars of the 71.8 billion dollars (about 40 per
2 More recent data confirm that more than 70 per cent
of all private demand deposits are in accounts in excess of
$5,000. These data are published elsewhere in this BULLETIN
through the courtesy of the FDIC.
cent) of demand deposits were insured as com-
pared with 25.2 billion dollars of the 28.1 billion
(about 90 per cent) of time and savings deposits.
If the contention that lack of confidence during
periods of economic adversity induces extensive
withdrawals of funds and forced liquidation of as-
sets with consequent destructions of bank deposits is
valid, then lack of confidence of large depositors
could bring about deposit declines of sufficient
magnitude to force widespread liquidation of bank
assets even if insured depositors held their funds
in banks intact. In the 1930-33 recession, according
to the findings of a study by the staff of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, deposit
withdrawals by large rather than small depositors
appeared to have exerted the main pressure on
banks' liquidity positions.
This study covered a large sample of banks with
deposits of from 1 to 40 million dollars (about half
of the total amount of deposits in closed banks
in this period were in banks of such size). It was
found that a presuspension decrease in deposits of
70 per cent took place in the balances of demand
deposit accounts of $100,000 or more. Although
demand accounts of $25,000 or more accounted for
only 28 per cent of total demand accounts on the
date from which deposit losses were measured, re-
ductions in the balances of accounts of this size ac-
counted for 43 per cent of the total reduction in
demand accounts.
It was further observed that the magnitude of
the percentage decrease in balances tended to de-
cline successively with each smaller-size deposit
class. Reductions in the balances at the lower
limit—accounts less than $500—were about 6 per
cent.
Finally, the size of account was found to be the
most important factor in explaining differences in
the instability of deposit balances in the 1930-33 pe-
riod. Other factors, it appeared, such as type of de-
posit (demand or time), residence of holder (local or
nonlocal), or type of holding (business or personal),
seemed to be of comparatively minor importance.
One of the arguments for not moving to full
deposit insurance coverage given in a previous sec-
tion is that such a step would remove the influence
which uninsured depositors may now have in en-
forcing good banking practices. On the other hand,
it may be pointed out that the restraint exercised by
large depositors is not the only factor tending to
enforce good banking practices. Apart from legis-
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lative and supervisory measures, some restraint may
be expected to come from bank stockholders, es-
pecially large stockholders, whose equity in the
bank is in the front line to meet losses under full,
partial, or no deposit coverage. It is possible, how-
ever, that both depositor and stockholder influence
may be relatively weak in periods of boom ac-
tivity when bank credit is expanding rapidly, and
relatively strong in periods of downturn when the
outlook is unfavorable and bankers are already on
guard against anything but the soundest of ventures.
The strengthening of such influence-at the peak and
during the downturn of the cycle, while "good
business" for those concerned for the individual
bank, has had harmful effects on the economy as a
whole.
In summary, the contention is that the useful-
ness of deposit insurance both in maintaining confi-
dence and in maintaining the money supply may be
significantly limited by the present restricted cover-
age. In other words, while there may be serious
risks of encouraging widespread loose banking by
relieving the banks of a large part of their concern
over the stability of deposits, there are also serious
risks for the banking system in leaving the large
depositor as the source of main liquidation pressure
in times of great financial strain. It is probably true
that the burdens of bank supervisory agencies
would increase significantly with full deposit cover-
age. Some would say that the supervisory role
would need to expand so much that it would tend
to encroach significantly on the field of manage-
ment.
Another argument that is advanced for the ex-
tension of deposit insurance coverage is that over
the period of its existence substantially full coverage
of all depositors has in fact been provided without,
however, the effects of such coverage being widely
understood and appreciated. Since its inauguration
the Corporation has either acted as receiver for,
or caused to be merged with other banks, 404 banks
with total deposits of 512 million dollars. Losses
on uninsured deposits included in this amount have
totaled less than 2 million dollars. This means that
liquidation of assets of these banks by the Corpora-
tion has resulted in practically full coverage of
deposits irrespective of size.
It may be noted that this experience probably
does not adequately cover the larger banks of the
country. It is extremely unlikely, however, that
the large banks holding the bulk of large deposits
would be permitted to close, in view of the experi-
ence of the mid-1930's. In effect then, large de-
positors in these banks enjoy 100 per cent protection
but the economy does not benefit from the stabiliz-
ing effect which would result from official recogni-
tion of that fact.
Still a third argument is that small business
needs the protection of full deposit coverage. It is
quite probable that the accounts of many small
businesses run over $5,000, especially since the
significant increase in the general price level.
The Federal Reserve survey of demand deposits
shows that over 52 per cent of noncorporate, i.e.,
small business, accounts are in the $10,000 or
less class. Losses in this type of deposit might
result in even greater economic distress to the com-
munity through unemployment, etc., than would
result from loss of deposits to individual small
deposit holders. In addition, widespread small busi-
ness failures resulting from banking difficulties
would involve a great social loss to the nation.
Another case for full deposit coverage has been
made by arguing that such extension is a desirable
complement to the banking and monetary reforms
of the mid-1930's. Legislative reforms were made
to. deal with the shiftability '(liquidity) of bank
assets, of which liberalized provisions for extension
of Federal Reserve Bank credit through lending or
open market operations and for the issue of cur-
rency are the most pertinent. Bank supervisory
practices have been modified and strengthened in
a way that should remove some unstabilizing factors
that were important in past periods of financial
crisis. These positive actions provide elasticity in
the credit structure and give some assurance that
the public may hold its cash balance either in de-
posits or in currency with equal assurance as to its
availability. Full coverage of deposits by insurance
is said to be needed to put this particular banking
reform on a par with these other measures for
financial stability*
The matter of equity as among large and small
banks is also advanced as a subsidiary argument
for extending insurance coverage to all deposits.
Banks holding large deposit accounts pay full assess-
ment on these accounts whereas only a small frac-
tion of the funds are insured. On the other hand,
banks having primarily small accounts are insured
practically up to the total volume of deposits on
which they are paying assessment. For example,
member banks, which tend to have most of the large
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accounts, hold about 85 per cent of commercial
bank deposits and pay about 85 per cent of the total
assessment paid by commercial banks for deposit
insurance. But only 37 per cent of member bank
deposits are covered by insurance. Nonmember
insured commercial banks, holding about 15 per
cent of total deposits and paying about 15 per cent
of the annual assessment, have 72 per cent of their
deposits covered by insurance.
The equity problem as among banks is not neces-
sarily as sharp as the foregoing statistics might
indicate. It can be said that as a practical matter
the larger banks are fully insured now, both in
consequence of the FDIC merger policy and be-
cause, as a matter of public policy, it is unlikely in
view of past experience that the larger banks would
be permitted to fail.
Related to the equity problem inherent in limited
deposit insurance is the disadvantage suffered
by country banks in competing with larger banks in
neighboring urban centers. Many large business
concerns with branch operations in country areas
as well as medium-sized and large local industries
prefer now to keep only minimum balances in local
banks. The reason for this is said to be that larger
well-established banks have a competitive advan-
tage over local banks only because of their size.
This particular competitive advantage would prob-
ably be lessened if deposit coverage were increased
or if all deposits were covered.
Another subsidiary argument advanced for in-
creased or full coverage has to do with the incon-
venience created for some depositors by limited
insurance coverage. Depositors with cash holdings
of more than $5,000 and who desire the protection
of full deposit coverage are seriously inconvenienced
by the necessity of dividing their accounts among
several banks, some of which may be many miles
away. Needless to add, the smaller banks feel that
they are discriminated against by a limited insur-
ance coverage which induces depositors to divide
deposits among banks.
Extension of limited deposit coverage. The case
for increasing deposit insurance coverage to some
amount larger than $5,000, say to $10,000 or to
$25,000, rests on much the same grounds as those
discussed for full coverage. In addition, however,
an extension of deposit insurance can be justified
on the basis of the significant rise in the general
price level and the increase in the amount of de-
posits in the hands of the public over the 14 years
since the inauguration of deposit insurance in its
present form. The wholesale price index has more
than doubled since 1935 while deposits have risen
fourfold. The number of depositors fully covered
has declined from more than 98 per cent of all de-
posit accounts to about 96 per cent. Probably there
is a substantial number of accounts that are com-
pletely covered only because depositors, perhaps at
considerable inconvenience, have split their ac-
counts.
Most of the arguments made against full cover-
age do not apply with as much force to an exten-
sion of limited coverage. In particular, such ex-
tension would not remove the "healthy" influence
large depositors are said to exert on the quality of
bank practices.
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN ASSESSMENT RATE
AND BASE
Most suggestions to lower or suspend the rate
on, or change the base for, deposit insurance stem
from the fact that the present fund is probably
of adequate size and that investment income from
it alone is currently more than adequate to meet
current losses and expenses. Modification or re-
form of the insurance system is also proposed on
grounds of equity—most proposals aim in the gen-
eral direction of giving relief to the larger banks
where a relatively small proportion of deposits is
insured under the present law in relation to assess-
ments paid.
Relief to insured ban\s through possible changes
in the assessment base. There are several methods
by which the present assessment base could be re-
duced so as to relieve insured banks of some part
of their current insurance assessment. There is,
however, only one method by which the present
system can be made proportional—namely, that
banks be assessed only on those deposits that are
fully insured. If the present limit in coverage were
kept, this method would reduce total assessments by
more than 55 per cent. Most of the benefit of the
decrease in assessment resulting from adoption of
a rigidly proportional base would, of course, go to
the banks holding the larger accounts.
A valid although not necessarily compelling ob-
jection to such a step is the fact, mentioned in an
earlier section, that all deposits at the larger banks
are in effect under official protection since as a mat-
ter of public policy it is unlikely that the banks hold-
ing the larger deposits would be permitted to fail.
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Other suggestions have been to reduce assess-
ments by narrowing the assessment base for banks
in general. One method would permit bank hold-
ings of United States Government securities to be
used as a deduction from the assessment base. To
the extent that banks hold Government securities
an equal amount of deposits may be said to be
backed by riskless, liquid assets—a form of insur-
ance. It is estimated that with such an assessment
base member banks would be paying about the
same proportion of assessments as under the present
base. In some respects, however, this method leaves
much to be desired. One effect of this method
would be to raise the effective interest yield to banks
on Government securities in accordance with the
assessment rate authorized, at present by 1/12 of
1 per cent. Placing an additional and fixed pre-
mium on Government securities, and thus en-
couraging banks to acquire and hold them, might
lead to undesirable effects, particularly at times
when monetary and debt management authorities
sought to exert their influence in an opposite di-
rection. However, if the deductible securities were
confined to bills, certificates and notes, some ad-
vantage might result in that individual banks might
be less disposed to shift from short-term to longer-
term securities in certain periods in order to profit
from higher yields and capital gains.
Another method sometimes suggested is to per-
mit deductions from the assessment base equal to
the amount of bank reserves and vault cash hold-
ings, which perform an insurance function in their
own right. Member banks would profit by about
20 million dollars a year at present deposit levels
if this assessment base were used. As in the pre-
ceding method, however, member banks would pay
about as large a proportion of total assessments as
under the present rate.
Another possible way to reduce the assessment
burden via a smaller assessment base would be by
deducting from the base the amount of public
funds on deposit. These deposits usually require
pledges of Government securities and so tend to
have the status of insured deposits. Member bank
assessments would be reduced by about 6 million
dollars under this procedure.
3
3 The question as to whether interbank deposits should be
included in the assessment base and whether these deposits
should be insured is relevant here. For purposes of this dis-
cussion interbank deposits have tentatively been taken to be
in the same category as other deposits, just as they are under
the present insurance law.
An assessment base could be developed which
would incorporate features of all the proposals
mentioned above. From the present base of total
deposits less cash items (the latter deducted to avoid
double counting of deposits) two additional deduc-
tions might be permitted.
(1) Vault cash and reserves. Presumably these
items cover deposits of an equal amount, dollar for
dollar, and no liquidating problem is involved.
(2) ShorMerm Government securities. Table 4
shows the estimated effect of such a change in base
on the assessment income of the Corporation in
TABLE 4
INSURANCE ASSESSMENTS UNDER PRESENT PLAN AND UNDER
PLAN TO GIVE CREDIT FOR CASH, CASH RESERVES, AND
BILLS, CERTIFICATES, AND NOTES, DECEMBER 31, 1948
[In millions of dollars]
Deposits for assess-









































































1948. Note that it would provide an income to
the FDIC of 78 million dollars (assuming no
change in the assessment rate) over and above the
net income from investments, or roughly equal to
three times the total deposit insurance losses met
by the Corporation since 1935.
This assessment base would thus cut the present
deposit insurance charges to member banks by
about one-third. It would reduce the charges to
both member and nonmember banks by about the
same percentage. It appears that almost any fea-
sible scheme for changing the base and/or the rate
would have little effect in reducing the dispropor-
tionately large share of the assessment now carried
by member banks in relation to coverage. Pre-
sumably, however, member banks would be inter-
ested in an absolute reduction in their dollar assess-
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ments even if it did not reduce the proportion of
the total assessment that they pay.
There is one general and telling objection to
the "narrowed assessment base" approach to the
problem of relieving banks of some part of their
present assessment burden, namely, that the method
is a circuitous way of arriving at a goal better at-
tained more directly. Furthermore, this approach
tends to complicate rather than to simplify deposit
insurance mechanics. If reform of the existing de-
posit insurance program is desirable it would seem
much better to accomplish it by means that elimi-
nate rather than enlarge the program's technical
complications.
Redefinition of the assessment base. Even if
there is no basic change made in the assessment
base to effect a reduction in the insurance burden
on banks, it has been argued that an effort ought
to be made to simplify the assessment procedures
and definitions. For computation of the deposit
base, deposits for some selected dates could be used
instead of the daily average of deposits now used.
The assessment base could be left for definition by
the FDIC (in consultation with the other Federal
bank supervisory agencies) in such a manner that
deposits for call report purposes, for reserve pur-
poses, and for assessment purposes would be simi-
lar, and that the definitions of cash items allow-
able as deductions from deposits for both reserve
and assessment purposes would be identical. At
present an effort is apparently being made to define
deposits for assessment purposes in a manner con-
sistent with deposits insured, disregarding the limi-
tation on the amount insured. For this reason trust
funds in the trust department are included in the
assessment base by the statute itself, even though
such funds are not treated as deposits for reserve
purposes nor for the purposes of the call report.
Drafts drawn on correspondent banks are, by rul-
ing of the Corporation, regarded as deposits for
assessment purposes, though not for reserve or call
report purposes. It would be helpful if the items
involved in the base formula were defined in such
a way that they could be identified with correspond-
ing items in the call report, as is now done in the
case of reports submitted for reserve purposes. This
would simplify preparation of reports for assess-
ment purposes, as well as the auditing of such re-
ports by the FDIC. The definitions probably ought
not, however, be written into the law in precise
terms; rather, the FDIC ought to be empowered to
define deposits and the various deduction items au-
thorized by law in a manner consistent with reserve
reports or call reports.
Relief for insured ban\s by changes in the
assessment rate. The present rate of 1/12 of 1 per
cent could, of course, be lowered by Congressional
action to any given rate with a proportional reduc-
tion in the assessment burden on insured banks.
Action to cut the rate by three-fourths (to 1/48 of
1 per cent) would yield on the present base an an-
nual income of over 25 million dollars, which is
about equal to total losses paid by the Corporation
in the past 13 years. If the insurance reserve fund
were gradually drawn down to what was consid-
ered a dangerously low level at this rate, an in-
crease could be made later on the basis of Con-
gressional review and determination.
A proposal has been advanced for moderating
the assessment burden by gearing the assessment
rate automatically and inversely to the size of the
insurance fund. That is to say, the rate would
decrease after the fund had reached a given (the
present) level and would increase after the fund
had fallen below a given level. This proposal has
one important disadvantage—it is procyclical in
effect. The fund would only be reduced by vir-
ture of the fact that a number of banks are in diffi-
culty. If this situation were sufficiently wide-
spread to reduce significantly the insurance fund,
this would be the best evidence that there was
under way a nation-wide pressure on bank liquidity.
To raise rates under these circumstances would add
a further demand on bank liquidity and would
aggravate rather than relieve the situation. By
the same logic the fact that the fund was increasing
in some period probably would reflect a high level
of economic activity in the country with character-
istic increased profits to most businesses including
banks. These are the circumstances when banks
could best afford to pay a higher assessment and to
rebuild the fund.
Another proposal for moderating the assessment
burden which involves an automaticity almost iden-
tical with the foregoing provides for varying the
rate in accordance with the loss experience of the
previous year and allows for an annual increase
in the fund of 25 million dollars from assessments
and income from investments. Income from in-
vestments, which has been running about 25 million
dollars, would of course be considered before the
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assessment requirement would be computed. The
proposal recommends that the assessment rate be
allowed to vary from a minimum of 1/96 of 1 per
cent to a maximum of 1/12 of 1 per cent of the
present deposit base. The proposal actually only
spells out in more detail the suggestion for an
assessment rate varying inversely with the size of
the fund. Like the other, it would have a pro-
cyclical effect.
Relief to banks from the present burden of
assessment could be made through an automatic
statutory formula for regulating the assessment
rate that would not be subject to these objections,
or at least not with the same force. A moving
average of insurance losses over a period, say 10
years, could be used as the basis of automatic rate
adjustment. Some procyclical effect would still
remain but its amount would be greatly moderated.
Table 5 illustrates the point. Deposit losses roughly
comparable to those experienced in 1930 and after
TABLE 5
ILLUSTRATION OF ALTERNATE METHODS OF COMPUTING





















































































































1 Assumptions based .on loss experience of 1930 and after.
8 Formula suggested by certain banker groups, except that pro-
vision for yearly increase in reserve fund of 25 million dollars is not
made.
*• Formula suggested in this memorandum.
* For purposes of simple computation, deposit base is assumed
to be unchanged over the years.
are assumed to occur over the 15-year period 1950
through 1964. Note that, during the period of large
deposit losses, the maximum permissible assessment
under the previous year loss formula would be re-
quired from banks at the very time the banking
system is undergoing the greatest liquidity diffi-
culties.
Under the moving average method, however, two
years of heavy losses would be taken with no in-
crease in assessment and the rise thereafter in the
rate would be small. Indeed, under the conditions
assumed, in only one year during the cycle would
the rate go as high as 1/12 (.08) of 1 per cent.
Rebuilding of the fund would be more concen-
trated in years of small loss experience, when
banks are best able to do so. In dollar amounts,
during the four years of large deposit losses banks
would have been assessed 346 million dollars under
the previous-year-loss method as compared with
120 million under the moving average method.
It will be noted, however, that despite the smaller
initial increases in assessments the integrity of the
fund would be maintained over the years by the
moving average method just as with the previous
loss method, providing of course that average loss
rates under both plans over a long period of time
do not exceed the maximum assessment rate.
It is probably desirable to make automatic provi-
sions for expanding the maximum size of the fund
should deposits increase. Provision for accomplish-
ing this may easily be written into the assessment
formula. Under any of the above automatic plans,
of course, statutory limitation of the maximum
assessment rate would help to limit the procyclical
effect.
A minimum assessment is usually suggested for
any plan of flexible rates because it is believed that
the insurance should not be free if for no other
than psychological reasons. This minimum assess-
ment rate is generally put at some very nominal
rate, say 1/50 or 1/100 of 1 per cent. However,
it may be that an assessment of such small pro-
portions (at 1/100 of 1 per cent, only 13 million
dollars for all participating banks under conditions
assumed in Table 5) might prove unduly irritating
to banks without compensating benefit. On grounds
of equity as among banks newly insured banks
should be required to bear for a period of time the
assessment rate of 1/12 of 1 per cent which other
insured banks have carried. This arrangement,
however, would not involve much of an addition
to FDIC receipts and would create serious adminis-
trative difficulties. Furthermore, it might not be
in the public interest since it could discourage banks
from FDIC membership.
On the basis of the considerations discussed above,
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an automatic statutory formula for determination
of the assessment rate, which would provide for
immediate relief of the assessment burden on banks,
have little procyclical effect, and relate growth of the
fund to the volume of total deposits at insured
banks, would be as follows:
 4
Assessments^
Average of recorded losses over preceding 10
years.
Provided that: the assessment rate shall never be
in excess of 1/12 of 1 per cent or
less than 1/50 of 1 per cent of
the assessment base, except that
if the insurance reserve fund
were greater than 3 per cent of
the total deposits, less cash assets
and U. S. Government securities,
of insured banks, the minimum
permissible rate would be 1/100
of 1 per cent.
Some flexibility for administrative discretion
could be introduced into deposit insurance assess-
ments. One method would be to permit the FDIC
to vary the rate within statutory limits, after con-
sultation with the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treas-
ury. Such authority should be subject to statutory
criteria. These might include size of fund, amount
of losses, level of reserve requirements, etc., as well
as the state of industrial, commercial, and agricul-
tural activity. It has been argued that since the
existence of the Corporation has been largely con-
fined to periods of increasing activity on all econo-
mic fronts, the past loss experience of the Corpora-
tion does not provide adequate statistical evidence
as to future adequacy of the size of the fund or
the level of assessment rates. Proposals for ad-
ministrative discretion with respect to the assess-
ment rate, however, do not contemplate authority
to raise the rate above the present level of 1/12 of
1 per cent. Accordingly, with this maximum, the
possibility of exceptionally high losses contem-
plated by proponents of administrative flexibility
could probably be covered just as effectively by an
automatic formula such as has been suggested as
4 An alternative possibility would be to keep the assessment
rate at the present 1/12 of 1 per cent and make dividend
allowances on the basis of the principles reflected in the
formula.
by discretionary authority. If the maximum rate
should prove inadequate, the matter of assessments
would in any event need to be fully reviewed again
by Congress.
APPENDIX A
FIVE-YEAR AVERAGE ASSESSMENT FORMULA
In the body of this study, an assessment formula
based on a 10-year moving average of losses to
the Corporation was suggested. An alternative
method using a moving average of 5 years is com-
pared with the 10-year average method in Table 6.
Use of the 5-year period results in a more rapid
increase in assessment rates during the period of
heavy bank deposit losses than does the 10-year
method. Assessments also decline more sharply
after the period of heavy deposit losses is past.
With the loss experience assumed, the assessments
under the 5-year average are also greater at their
peak than are assessments under the 10-year average.
Both plans would rebuild the fund over the full
period illustrated, but the 5-year average would
tend to concentrate more of this rebuilding in the
period of banking crisis.
TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF THE USE OF A 5-YEAR AND A 10-YEAR MOVING
AVERAGE FOR COMPUTING ASSESSMENT FOR DEPOSIT
INSURANCE FOR INSURED COMMERCIAL BANKS
(Based on loss experience, 1930 and after)















































































































*For purposes of simple computation, the deposit base was
assumed to be unchanged over the years. Excess of interest income
over current expenses was assumed to average 10 million dollars.
2 Using the suggested upper limit of
 l/it of 1 per cent.
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